摘要

这是巴菲特1974年3月写给股东的信，主要谈了以下几个重点。

1973年财务状况总体令人满意，营业利润为11,930,592美元，初始股东权益的回报率达17.4%；

纺织业需求大，但纤维短缺使机器生产能力运用不充分，某些纤维价格飙升，影响利润；

保险业国家赔付和国家火险汽车和一般责任险承保状况良好，但业务额下降，竞争激烈；

伊利诺伊州银行与信托公司取得创纪录的一年，存款增加，利润高于普通存款利率。多元化零售公司将并入伯克希尔公司，交易尚需许可证明。

附：中文全文

致Berkshire Hathaway全体股东：

1973年我们的财务状况是比较令人满意的。营业利润11,930,592美元，初始股东权益的回报率达17.4%。虽然每股的营业利润从11.43美元上升至12.18美元，但和1972年的19.8%的利润率相比，权益利润有所下跌。这是因为股东投资的增加并不相当于利润的增加。

在去年的年度报告中我们预料到了出现这种情况的可能性。很不幸，我们的预测成为了现实。

我们的纺织、银行，和大部分的保险业务表现都不错，但保险业某些特定的部门却有些不尽如人意。总体上来说，保险仍将继续是投入资金的最理想的行业之一。

管理层的目标是，在运用合理的会计和债务政策的同时，长期的资金回报率能够平均高于国内行业整体的回报率。过去的几年我们一直保持了这样的成绩，也正在努力采取各种措施帮助我们继续维持这一成绩。预计1974年我们的资本金仍将面临回报率的进一步下降。

纺织业

1973年对纺织品的需求还是非常之大的。问题主要是纤维的短缺，需要复杂操作流程的纤维短缺就使机器生产能力的运用显得不那么充分。某些纤维的价格在这一年飙升。价格管制委员会的规定使很多制成品的价格没有达到我们某些竞争对手的定位。但是利润回报跟我们的资金投入相比还是合理的，虽然如果我们按照市场水平定价的话回报可能会更高一些。

纺织业有很强的周期性，价格管制会帮助清除很多的障碍，但也会带来其他一些副作用。由于1973年原材料的价格飞涨（这一趋势1974年有望继续），我们决定采用存货估价的'后进先出法'。这种方法能够更好的反映当前的成本，并使得报告利润中的存货“利润”最小化。关于这一改变更多的信息，可以查看我们财务报表的附注部分。

保险业

1973年，Jack Ringwalt从国家赔付总裁的职务上退休。这家公司自1940年创立以来，Jack给它带来了绝佳的营业记录。接替他的是Phil Liesche,很幸运的是，在保险和管理方面，他坚持着和Jack一样的做事方式。

我们主要的保险业务是国家赔付和国家火险经营的汽车和一般责任险。这两项业务1973年的承保状况都非常好。但业务额还是又一次下降了。竞争很激烈，我们放弃了像一些乐观的承保者那样降低利率的机会。目前有些微弱的迹象表明这些人中的一些已经意识到了他们利率（以及损失储备）的不足。或许这可以缓解市场上的压力。如果真是这样的话，那我们就可以期望交易额的上升了。

再保险业务也差不多面临了同样的局面——整体表现不错，但很难达到之前的交易额水平。由兢兢业业的George Young领导的这一部门，自其1969年成立起就一直是主要的盈利部门。本土化保险公司在Nebraska和Minnesota两州的发展很好，业务量有了显著增长，亏损率也在可接受范围内。年底Iowa的业务也已展开。

最大的问题在Texas，由于原来的管理层无法有效地成功地经营，我们必须重新开始。这样做的代价是很高昂的，我们的工作会十分艰巨。但是，从总体来看，本土化业务有着巨大的潜力。

主营城市汽车保险的家庭与汽车保险公司这一年在芝加哥的经营状况很差。看起来在Cook County这一主要营业地区的利率是不够充分的，尽管当前的能源局势让事情更加复杂。问题在于降低了的事故发生频率（石油价格上升，人们驾车出行次数相对减少）是否会抵消医疗和修理赔付价格的上升。

我们认为，相对于事故低发于我们的帮助，价格上升对我们的冲击更大，但貌似一些竞争对手不这么认为。家庭与汽车保险公司在这一年将业务拓展到了Florida和California两周，但目前还不能确定这样做会不会带来收益。

家庭与汽车保险公司业绩较差的其中一个影响因素是会计系统，它不能有效及时的把信息反映到管理层。这一年保险公司的投资也过多地集中于普通股，这就使年底普通股股份出现了超过1200万美元的浮亏，这个可以在财务报表上看到。

但是我们相信，从企业内在价值看我们持有的普通股投资组合是物有所值的。虽然在年末出现了大量的未实付损失，但从更长远来看，这一投资组合会给我们带来满意的收益。

银行业经营

位于罗克福德的伊利诺伊州银行与信托公司又取得了创纪录的一年。平均存款接近1亿3千万美元，其中60%为定期存款。

自年中起政策允许的上限提升了之后，消费者储蓄利率有了大幅上升。尽管这一政策主要针对计息存款，但我们的税后（包括一项新的伊利诺伊州的收入所得税）利润还是高出了普通存款的2.1%。我们现在仍然是罗克福德最大的银行，仍旧保持了超常的流动性，仍然能够满足客户不断增长的贷款需求，并且仍旧维持了很高的盈利。

这要直接归功于董事会主席Gene Abegg和总裁Bob Kline的领导才干，前者从1931年银行成立起就一直管理着它的业务。

并购多元化零售公司

董事们已经同意了将多元化零售公司并入伯克希尔公司，条件是将其100万股流通股转换成195,000股伯克希尔的股票。

鉴于多元化零售公司及其子公司已持有109,551股伯克希尔的股份，因此这笔交易带来的伯克希尔流通股份净增长不会超过85,449股。

要完成这笔交易，还必须要获得各种各样的许可证明，委托资料在晚些时候会递交董事会投票决定。多元化零售公司经营着一家平价女士衣物连锁店，同时还经营着再保险业务。但在管理层看来，这家公司最重要的资产是占其股份16%的蓝筹印花邮票。

蓝筹印花邮票

去年年底我们所持有的蓝筹印花邮票的股份已经占到了其总发行股份的19%。然后，我们又增购了一些股份使其达到22.5%：而想要真正收购多元化零售公司这一数字必须要达到38.5%。

我们对蓝筹印花邮票权益在1973年第一次显得如此重要，也就带来了一个会计上的问题：那就是哪一段时间的利润收入才应被记录到我们今年的财务报告中去呢。

蓝筹印花邮票的会计年度截止于最接近2月28号的星期六，是伯克希尔会计年度结束之后两个月。或者说，他们的会计年度比我们的提早十个月结束。对于我们来说，一个可以接受的办法就是，鉴于我们之前拥有的蓝筹印花邮票较少的股份，在我们1973年的收入中囊括进蓝筹印花邮票632,000美元的权益收入（他们1973年的会计年截止于3月3号）。

但是这种做法似乎与现实情况不符，并且意味着以后每年计算时都会有十个月的差池。因此，我们的选择是在蓝筹印花邮票公布的截止到11月份的未经审计的中期收入的基础上，将1,008,000美元的蓝筹印花邮票权益包括在我们1973年的收入中。

由于我们采用了这种虽未经审计但却是当前的数据，而不是那种审计过却早已过时的数据，Peat,Marwick,Mitchell&Co.会计公司无法对我们1973年盈利中来自蓝筹印花邮票的部分作出判断。

蓝筹印花邮票的年度报告，包括由普华永道审计的截止于1974年3月2号的财务报表，在五月初就会公布。Berkshire Hathaway Inc.任何有兴趣的股东，都可以到时写信给加利福尼亚州洛杉矶东南大街5801号蓝筹印花邮票公司秘书Mr.Robert H.Bird,邮编90040，获得一份报告。

蓝筹印花邮票公司的证券投资业务自去年来有了大幅下滑，但是其子公司喜事糖果公司以及Wesco金融公司还有相当强大的盈利能力，后者是一家经营储蓄和贷款业务的企业。我们希望蓝筹印花邮票未来几年的会有不错的盈利收入，当然如果证券投资业务不下滑的话利润收入肯定会更高。

你们的董事长现在也同时管理着蓝筹印花邮票，Wesco金融公司以及喜事糖果公司的董事会，三家企业的管理人员都是一流并且经验丰富的。

太阳报业

在1969年的年度报告中，我们提到了对太阳报业的收购，这是一家在奥马哈市区发行的周报企业。以后的年度报告中，我们一直没有提到它的运营情况，也没有采取措施加强其盈利能力，因为这家公司规模较小，财务状况也就“不那么理想”。

但在1973年这种“不理想”的状态并没有影响到出版物的质量。5月7号太阳报业凭借它1972年5月30号一篇关于当地Boys Town（孤儿乐园）的专题调查报道获得了普利策奖。这是历史上第一次一家周报在这一领域获此荣誉。这篇文章报道了自从1948年Flanagan神父去世后不断积累的财富和不断恶化的服务质量之间的矛盾。

除了普利策奖之外，该报纸还赢得了Sigma Delta Chi（全国性的专业记者协会）的Public Service Award，以及其它的七个全国性的荣誉。

我们要祝贺编辑Paul Williams，出版商Stan Lipsey，还有太阳报业的全体工作人员，他们的成就让我们明白出版的水平并不一定和报纸的规模划等号。

沃伦·巴菲特

董事会主席

1974年3月29日

附：英文全文

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Operating results for 1974 overall were unsatisfactory due to the poor performance of our insurance business. In last year’s annual report some decline in profitability was predicted but the extent of this decline, which accelerated during the year, was a surprise. Operating earnings for 1974 were $8,383,576, or $8.56 per share, for a return on beginning shareholders’ equity of 10.3%. This is the lowest return on equity realized since 1970. Our textile division and our bank both performed very well, turning in improved results against the already good figures of 1973. However, insurance underwriting, which has been mentioned in the last several annual reports as running at levels of unsustainable profitability, turned dramatically worse as the year progressed.

The outlook for 1975 is not encouraging. We undoubtedly will have sharply negative comparisons in our textile operation and probably a moderate decline in banking earnings. Insurance underwriting is a large question mark at this time—it certainly won’t be a satisfactory year in this area, and could be an extremely poor one. Prospects are reasonably good for an improvement in both insurance investment income and our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps. During this period we plan to continue to build financial strength and liquidity, preparing for the time when insurance rates become adequate and we can once again aggressively pursue opportunities for growth in this area.

Textile Operations

During the first nine months of 1974 textile demand was exceptionally strong, resulting in very firm prices. However, in the fourth quarter significant weaknesses began to appear, which have continued into 1975.

We currently are operating at about one-third of capacity. Obviously, at such levels operating losses must result. As shipments have fallen, we continuously have adjusted our level of operations downward so as to avoid building inventory.

Our products are largely in the curtain goods area. During a period of consumer uncertainty, curtains may well be high on the list of deferrable purchases. Very low levels of housing starts also serve to dampen demand. In addition, retailers have been pressing to cut inventories generally, and we probably are feeling some effect from these efforts. These negative trends should reverse in due course, and we are attempting to minimize losses until that time comes.

Insurance Underwriting

In the last few years we consistently have commented on the unusual profitability in insurance underwriting. This seemed certain eventually to attract unintelligent competition with consequent inadequate rates. It also has been apparent that many insurance organizations, major as well as minor, have been guilty of significant underreserving of losses, which inevitably produces faulty information as to the true cost of the product being sold. In 1974, these factors, along with a high rate of inflation, combined to produce a rapid erosion in underwriting results.

The costs of the product we deliver (auto repair, medical payments, compensation benefits, etc.) are increasing at a rate we estimate to be in the area of 1% per month. Of course, this increase doesn’t proceed in an even flow but, inexorably, inflation grinds very heavily at the repair services—to humans and to property—that we provide. However, rates virtually have been unchanged in the property and casualty field for the last few years. With costs moving forward rapidly and prices remaining unchanged, it was not hard to predict what would happen to profit margins.

Best’s, the authoritative voice of the insurance industry, estimates that in 1974 all auto insurance premiums in the United States increased only about 2%. Such a growth in the pool of dollars available to pay insured losses and expenses was woefully inadequate. Obviously, medical costs applicable to people injured during the year, jury awards for pain and suffering, and body shop charges for repairing damaged cars increased at a dramatically greater rate during the year. Since premiums represent the sales dollar and the latter items represent the cost of goods sold, profit margins turned sharply negative.

As this report is being written, such deterioration continues. Loss reserves for many giant companies still appear to be understated by significant amounts, which means that these competitors continue to underestimate their true costs. Not only must rates be increased sufficiently to match the month-by-month increase in cost levels, but the existed expenserevenue gap must be overcome. At this time it appears that insurors must experience even more devastating underwriting results before they take appropriate pricing action.

All major areas of insurance operations, except for the “home state” companies, experienced significantly poorer results for the year.

The direct business of National Indemnity Company, our largest area of insurance activity, produced an underwriting loss of approximately 4% after several years of high profitability. Volume increased somewhat, but we are not encouraging such increases until rates are more adequate. At some point in the cycle, after major insurance companies have had their fill of red ink, history indicates that we will experience an inflow of business at compensatory rates. This operation, headed by Phil Liesche, a most able underwriter, is staffed by highly profit-oriented people and we believe it will provide excellent earnings in most future years, as it has in the past.

Intense competition in the reinsurance business has produced major losses for practically every company operating in the area. We have been no exception. Our underwriting loss was something over 12%—a horrendous figure, but probably little different from the average of the industry. What is even more frightening is that, while about the usual number of insurance catastrophes occurred during 1974, there really was no “super disaster” which might have accounted for the poor figures of the industry. Rather, a condition of inadequate rates prevails, particularly in the casualty area where we have significant exposure. Our reinsurance department is run by George Young, an exceptionally competent and hardworking manager. He has cancelled a great many contracts where prices are totally inadequate, and is making no attempt to increase volume except in areas where premiums are commensurate with risk. Based upon present rate levels, it seems highly unlikely that the reinsurance industry generally, or we, specifically, will have a profitable year in 1975.

Our “home state” companies, under the leadership of John Ringwalt, made good progress in 1974. We appear to be developing a sound agency group, capable of producing business with acceptable loss ratios. Our expense ratios still are much too high, but will come down as the operation develops into units of economic size. The Texas problem which was commented upon in last year’s report seems to be improving. We consider the “home state” operation one of our most promising areas for the future.

Our efforts to expand Home and Automobile Insurance Company into Florida proved disastrous. The underwriting loss from operations in that market will come to over $2 million, a very large portion of which was realized in 1974. We made the decision to drop out of the Florida market in the middle of 1974, but losses in substantial amounts have continued since that time because of the term nature of insurance contracts, as well as adverse development of outstanding claims. We can’t blame external insurance industry conditions for this mistake. In retrospect, it is apparent that our management simply did not have the underwriting information and the pricing knowledge necessary to be operating in the area. In Cook County, where Home and Auto’s volume traditionally has been concentrated, evidence also became quite clear during 1974 that rates were inadequate. Therefore, rates were increased during the middle of the year but competition did not follow; consequently, our volume has dropped significantly in this area as competitors take business from us at prices that we regard as totally unrealistic.

While the tone of this section is pessimistic as to 1974 and 1975, we consider the insurance business to be inherently attractive. Our overall return on capital employed in this area—even including the poor results of 1974—remains high. We have made every effort to be realistic in the calculation of loss and administrative expense. Because of accruals, this had a double effect at both the bank and corporate level in 1974.

Under present money market conditions, we expect bank earnings to be down somewhat in 1975 although we believe they still are likely to compare favorably with those of practically any banking institution in the country.

Blue Chip Stamps

During 1974 we increased our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps to approximately 25.5% of the outstanding shares of that company. Overall, we are quite happy about the results of Blue Chip and its prospects for the future. Stamp sales continue at a greatly reduced level, but the Blue Chip management has done an excellent job of adjusting operating costs. The See’s Candy Shops, Inc. subsidiary had an outstanding year, and has excellent prospects for the future.

Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 64% owned subsidiary, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops, Inc. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to be a source of continued substantial earning power for Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ended March 1, 1975 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at any time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

Merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.

As you previously have been informed, the proposed merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. was terminated by the respective Boards of Directors on January 28, 1975. We continue to view such a merger as eventually desirable, and hope to reopen the subject at some future time.

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

March 31, 1975

(本文由公众号越声情报(ystz927)整理，仅供参考，不构成具体投资建议。如需要操作，请注意仓位控制，风险自负。)

在中国A股市场中，股民们经过了二十多年的经验，总结出股票的运作是有规律可循的。而一些资深智慧的老股民也根据自己多年股市的经验也总结出一个个适合自己的盈利模式。经过多年的实战技巧分总结出成功率比较高的操盘口诀，希望对大家能有所帮助。

一、买阴不买阳，卖阳不卖阴;逆市而动，才是英雄

这一口诀是讲逆市而动的道理，即，买时选K线收阴线时买;卖时选K线收阳线时卖。

二、冲高抛，跳水进，横盘不交易

此条口诀一语道破天机,这条简单、基本的道理，实际最根本、最有效。不懂此诀，交易万次，业不过是股市中的盲人瞎马，最终难免一死。每日念此决，日久天长，养成习惯，方能百炼成钢。前两句好理解，后一句“横盘不交易”是操作应该格外注意的，横盘时交易，一旦反向变盘，你必然会去止损或者追涨，这两者都是不可取的。横盘时差价不大，没有耐心，多次交易，势必造成手续费亏损。

三、下手买股先准备，宁可少进勿多买

这口诀是说一资金的分配使用问题，你不能一下子把资金全都买进去。会买，买在低点才是真正的师傅，卖则不那么重要了，只是赚多赚少的问题了。下手买股之前，必须做好股价下跌、被套后在低位加仓补进的准备，而不是人常说的什么技术上的止损，那是要你割肉，全是害人的瞎话。自有股市以来，只有“金字塔式买入法”是操作技法上唯一一条永恒不变的真理。金字塔式投资方法，它是一种分批买卖股票的方法。即买入股票时，愈买愈少;卖出股票时，愈卖愈多。

四、高低盘整，先等一等

这一口诀的内容包括了“横盘不交易”的内容，但主要的意思是说，当一只股票持续上涨或者下跌了一段时间后就进入了横盘状态，此时不必在高位全仓卖出，也不必在低位全仓买进，因为盘整后就会变盘，所以盘整时期不可主观决定建仓或清仓。如果是高位向下变，则及时清仓，不会有损失;如果是低位向高变，及时追进，也不会踏空。

五、高位横盘又冲高，抓紧时机赶紧抛;低位横盘再新低，重仓买进好时机

这一口诀是对口诀四的进一步具体说明。股价和大盘常常是高位盘整后还有新高，低位盘整后又创新低，因此，要等待变盘的方向明朗后再开始。如高位横盘后向上变盘，再创出新高，这是卖出的最佳时机;而低位横盘整理之后再向下变盘，将是满仓买入的最佳时机。

短线看盘心法口诀：

短线高手打短线，后个股来先大盘;先看六一英雄榜，如目最好三涨板;

此日个股可不做，持币空仓远远观;二看涨跌家数比，涨不过半阴雨天;

首页三十五只股，最末一名超百三;若是头版无百四，个股量比未过三;

三看量价配合否，价量不合必疲软;四看沪深与A.B.，若有背离藏隐患;

五看敏感时间窗，五八十三易变盘;六看大盘技术位，高阴三十整数关。

看完大盘说个股，周月指标很关键;短线K.D.高与低，月先周后然后天;

目标八一与八三，涨幅量比皆靠前;三日均线带量扬，K.D.不过六十关。

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